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The recent debate in the United States over ratifying the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) includ-
ed frequent references to the economic models used to an-
alyze the agreement's impact on the Canadian, Mexican, 
and U.S. economies. The type of model used most often 
for this analysis has been an applied general equilibrium 
(AGE) model. In fact, at a U.S. International Trade Com-
mission conference held in February 1992 and open to all 
economists studying the economy wide impact of NAFTA, 
11 of the 12 studies presented used AGE models (U.S. In-
ternational Trade Commission 1992). 
In this article, we discuss the work of four modeling 
teams who presented their results at that conference and at 
an earlier conference on North American economic inte-
gration, which was held at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis in March 1991. All of these teams' approach-
es are good examples of AGE models: Brown, Deardorff, 
and Stern model NAFTA's impact on all three national 
economies; Cox and Harris focus on Canada; Sobarzo fo-
cuses on Mexico; and Markusen, Rutherford, and Hunter 
analyze NAFTA's impact on a single industry—the auto-
mobile industry—which accounts for a major portion of 
trade in North America. 
All of these researchers use static AGE models of the 
sort discussed in the other article in this issue. All of their 
models emphasize increasing returns and imperfect com-
petition. Because all the models make different assump-
tions and focus on different countries and industries, how-
ever, they obtain different results. Nevertheless, where the 
models overlap, they agree about the impact of NAFTA. 
Specifically, these studies find that, because Mexico's 
economy is the smallest, it will enjoy the biggest NAFTA-
produced increase in economic welfare, measured as a per-
centage of gross domestic product (GDP): somewhere in 
the range of from 2 to 5 percent. The studies predict that 
the United States will see a very modest NAFTA increase 
in welfare of around 0.1 percent of GDP, while Canada 
will notice no increase beyond what it experiences as a re-
sult of its Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United 
States, which went into effect in 1989. 
Are these results reliable? We think so. The reason is 
the way static AGE models are constructed. They empha-
size the interaction among an economy's different sectors, 
or industries, which makes the models excellent tools for 
estimating the economic impact of reallocating resources 
within an economy. 
Like all types of economic models, however, static 
AGE models have their limitations. They stress sectoral 
detail, but they ignore dynamic phenomena, that is, phe-
nomena which involve time and uncertainty. To assess the 
importance of this omission, we discuss here two examples 
of dynamic phenomena that NAFTA is likely to affect: la-
bor force adjustment and capital flows. Although static 
models are not well suited to analyzing such phenomena, 
the results of the models discussed here indicate their po-
tential importance. For instance, including capital flows 
17 modeled in very crude ways boosts Mexico's NAFTA 
gains from 2-5 percent to 5-11 percent of GDP. 
The emphasis on sectoral detail rather than dynamic 
phenomena in many of the NAFTA analyses can be par-
tially understood in terms of the recent history of AGE 
modeling. The four models we discuss here are intellectu-
al descendants of models developed by Harris (1984) and 
Brown and Stern (1989) to analyze the impact of the then-
potential U.S.-Canada FTA. In terms of output per work-
er, Canada and the United States are very similar; they 
have very similar levels of economic development. In 
terms of population and output, however, the two coun-
tries are very different: Canada is much smaller than the 
United States. (See the data in the box titled "The North 
American Free Trade Area vs. The European Union.") 
Consequently, phenomena such as increasing returns and 
market size are crucial in the analysis of the FTA between 
these two countries. 
Those phenomena are also important in the analysis of 
NAFTA's impact on Mexico, since this country is also 
much smaller than the United States. But Mexico has a 
significantly lower level of output per worker (and wages) 
than either the United States or Canada. Therefore, 
NAFTA's impact on phenomena like capital flows is very 
important for Mexico. Preliminary efforts at analyzing 
such flows have been made by Kehoe (1994), McCleery 
(1994), and Young and Romero (1994). 
The results presented here indicate the need for contin-
uing efforts to construct satisfactory dynamic models to 
analyze the potential impact of policies like NAFTA. They 
also indicate the need for models that incorporate the la-
bor force adjustment process, a phenomenon neglected by 
existing AGE models. 
Modest Gains Predicted 
We now begin our examination of the methods and results 
of the four models' analyses of NAFTA's impact. We find 
significant areas of agreement among the results. Any dis-
agreement is easily explained by the models' different as-
sumptions. 
Some Data Caveats 
Before proceeding to the models themselves, however, we 
must point out a few aspects of the data they use. (Any 
AGE model is only as good as the data used to calibrate 
it.) 
First, in interpreting the results of these models, note 
that because of data limitations, all of the models rely on 
pre-1989 data. Thus their simulations capture the effects 
of more than just NAFTA. They also capture the effects 
of the FTA between Canada and the United States and 
some effects of Mexico's general lowering of trade barri-
ers. (See the box titled "La Apertura: The Opening of 
Mexico.") But combining these developments is natural: 
NAFTA is appropriately viewed as a small step in further-
ing the tendency toward greater economic integration in 
North America. 
Second, note that all of the models use different data 
sources and different commodity classification systems. 
Consequently, comparing results across models is difficult. 
At the very least, an AGE modeler has the obligation to 
provide a concordance of the aggregation in his or her 
model with a standard classification system. This concor-
dance will be essential for comparing model results with 
actual outcomes after several years' experience with 
NAFTA. 
Third, and most important for an AGE model that ad-
dresses international trade issues, data from one country 
must be compatible with data from another. One disturb-
ing feature of the Mexican data compared to the U.S. data 
is the difference between the share of returns to capital in 
the national income of the two countries. In Mexico, this 
number is about 70 percent (330 trillion out of total factor 
income of 460 trillion), whereas in the United States, it is 
about 25 percent. (See Table 2 of the other article in this 
issue.) One approach to handling these data—the one tak-
en in the models discussed here—is to accept the data at 
face value and to calibrate the production functions accord-
ingly. Another approach is to look for reasons why the two 
capital shares are so different. Some possibilities are dif-
ferent treatment of the earnings of self-employed workers 
in the two countries, different composition of national out-
put, higher monopoly rents in Mexico, and more black 
market labor in Mexico. Whatever the cause or causes, the 
comparability of data across countries is obviously a seri-
ous issue that requires more research. 
Three North American Economies 
Having made these caveats about the data, we can begin 
our discussion of the four static AGE models. We start 
with a model of NAFTA's impact on all three North 
American economies. 
Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (1994) study four fully 
specified economies: those of Canada, Mexico, and the 
United States and an aggregate rest-of-the-world economy. 
The Brown-Deardorff-Stern (BDS) model includes sub-
stantial sectoral detail, with 23 tradable goods based on 
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La Apertura: The Opening of Mexico  Charts 1 and 2 
Some Effects of la Apertura 
Annually, 1980-92, Billions of U.S. Dollars 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is not 
the beginning of free trade policy in Mexico; rather, it is the 
culmination of a decade-long policy of openness, or la aper-
tura, which has substantially dismantled trade barriers. 
Until 1982, Mexico pursued an economic development 
strategy based heavily on government intervention and pro-
tectionism—with some success. Much of the investment in 
Mexico, especially in the late 1970s and early 1980s, was fi-
nanced by government borrowing from abroad and by oil 
sales. 
In 1982, after international interest rates rose and oil 
prices fell, Mexico was unable to meet its debt service obli-
gations, which resulted in a financial collapse. Thus the Mex-
ican government sharply cut expenditures and raised taxes. 
It also increased its protection of Mexican firms against for-
eign competition, making the Mexican economy one of the 
most closed in the world. In 1985, Mexico had tariffs as 
high as 100 percent, licenses required for 92 percent of goods 
imported, and a general restriction of 49 percent on foreign 
ownership of Mexican companies. (For details, see ten Kate 
1992.) 
In 1985, however, the Mexican government changed 
course. It joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) in 1986 and started the process of opening the Mex-
ican economy to foreign trade and investment. 
Since then, Mexico's trade barriers have fallen rapidly, 
with the maximum tariff dropping to 20 percent, most im-
port licensing requirements being eliminated, and foreign in-
vestment laws being liberalized. Chart 1 depicts the substan-
tial impact of la apertura on Mexican trade with the United 
States. Notice the sharp growth in trade, especially U.S. ex-
ports to Mexico, starting in 1987. Chart 2 depicts the corre-
sponding impact on foreign investment in Mexico. Notice, 
in particular, the significant effect of opening the Mexican 
stock market to foreign private portfolio investment in 1988. 
Chart 1 Trade Between Mexico and the United States 
1980 1985 
Source: International Monetary Fund 
Chart 2 Foreign Investment in Mexico 
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one- and three-digit International Standard Industrial Clas-
sification (ISIC) product categories and 6 nontradable 
goods based on one-digit ISIC product categories. All of 
the tradable good sectors except agriculture are modeled 
as producing products differentiated by firm. The firms in 
these sectors face increasing returns production technolo-
gies and are monopolistic competitors as defined by the 
theory developed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and de-
scribed by us in the other article in this issue. Agriculture 
and the nontradable goods are homogeneous within coun-
tries and are produced under conditions of constant re-
turns, and firms in these sectors are perfect competitors. 
Agricultural goods in different countries are imperfect sub-
stitutes, which is the Armington specification we also de-
19 scribe in the other article in this issue. 
Table 1 summarizes the aggregate results of three dif-
ferent simulations of the BDS model designed to analyze 
the impact of freer trade in the three North American econ-
omies. In the first, Brown, Deardorff, and Stern simulate 
the reductions of the tariffs and other trade barriers that 
will occur over 15 years. (These reductions are summa-
rized in the box titled "NAFTA Mechanics.") Since the 
BDS model, like the others we will discuss, is static, it 
cannot analyze the impact of gradual reductions of barriers 
scheduled to take place in some sectors; the full change 
must be modeled as taking place once and for all. In the 
second simulation, Brown, Deardorff, and Stern simulate 
the same reductions in trade barriers, but also increase the 
capital stock in Mexico by 10 percent, in order to simulate 
the impact of the reduction in investment barriers; this ad-
ditional capital is modeled as coming from the rest of the 
world. In the third simulation, Brown, Deardorff, and Stern 
simulate only the tariff reductions involved in the U.S.-
Canada FTA. 
The most striking result of the BDS simulations is that, 
no matter what scenario is considered, the impact of 
NAFTA on Mexico, relative to the size of its economy, is 
much larger than the comparable impacts on Canada or 
the United States. In fact, NAFTA's impact on the United 
States, although positive, is barely perceptible as a percent-
age of GDP. The basic scenario of reducing tariffs and 
other trade barriers results in a gain in economic welfare 
equivalent to 2.2 percent of GDP in Mexico, as opposed 
to 0.7 percent in Canada and 0.1 percent in the United 
States. 
These results are partly explained by the relative sizes 
of the different economies: since the United States is much 
larger than either Canada or Mexico, similar absolute gains 
in each country would be a much smaller percentage of 
GDP in the United States than in its two neighbors. An-
other partial explanation is that the United States, as a 
large and fairly open country, is not able to realize large 
gains by exploiting increasing returns due to a larger mar-
ket size. (Some data on the relative sizes of the three 
Table 1 
NAFTA's Potential Effects 
According to the Brown, Deardorff, and Stern Model 
Predicted % Change in Each Country's 
Experiment  Country 
Welfare 
(GDP)  Wage Rate  Rental Rate  Terms of" 
1. Remove North American  Canada  .7  .5  .6  -.7 
tariffs and nontariff  Mexico  2.2  .4  .8  -1.1 
trade barriers.*  United States  .1  .2  .2  .3 
Other  .0  -.1  -.1  .0 
2. Same as (V PLUS  Canada  .7  .6  .7  -.7 
Reduce investment  Mexico  5.4  7.2  3.0  -4.8 
barriers in Mexico.**  United States  .1  .2  .2  .1 
Other  .0  .0  .2  .2 
3. Remove tariffs  Canada  .7  .6  .6  -.7 
between Canada and  Mexico  .0  -.1  .0  .0 
the United States.  United States  .0  .1  .1  .2 
Other  .0  -.1  -.1  .0 
"The nontariff barrier change is a 25% expansion of U.S. import quotas on Mexican exports of food, textiles, and clothing. 
"The investment barrier change is a relaxation of Mexico's capital import controls that results in a 10% increase in the capital stock there. 
Source: Brown, Deardorff, and Stern 1994, Table 1 
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North American countries and the trade between them are 
presented in the box titled "The North American Free 
Trade Area vs. The European Union" and in the Appen-
dix.) 
Another interesting result produced by the BDS model 
simulations is that NAFTA has very little impact on Cana-
da above and beyond that generated by the U.S.-Canada 
FTA. Public discussion of NAFTA in Canada has includ-
ed concern that the agreement will cause import diversion 
in the United States, that U.S. importers will switch from 
NAFTA Mechanics 
In August 1992, representatives of Canada, Mexico, and the 
United States concluded their negotiations of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This agreement 
has since been signed by the heads of the governments of all 
three countries and ratified by their legislatures. As of Janu-
ary 1,1994, NAFTA created a free trade area with more than 
360 million people and a combined gross domestic product 
of roughly $6.5 trillion (in U.S. dollars). 
NAFTA lifts trade barriers primarily between Mexico and 
its North American neighbors. In 1992, Mexican tariffs on 
imports from the United States averaged about 10 percent 
when weighted by the value imported; at the same time, U.S. 
tariffs on imports from Mexico averaged about 4 percent. 
Canada and the United States had no tariffs on most of their 
trade; they had made a separate free trade agreement, which 
took effect in January 1989. NAFTA substantially reduces 
nontariff trade barriers, such as import quotas, sanitary regu-
lations, and licensing requirements, although these are not 
eliminated. Recently, North American countries have had 
few restrictions on capital flows. The obvious exceptions are 
in Mexico and are laws prohibiting private ownership, for-
eign or domestic, in the petroleum industry and parts of the 
petrochemical industry, laws restricting foreign investment 
in the financial and insurance sectors, and laws institutional-
izing communal ownership of much agricultural lands, the 
ejido system. 
NAJFTA eliminates tariffs on trade among the three coun-
tries over a period of 15 years, it substantially reduces non-
tariff barriers over the same period, and it immediately en-
sures the free flow of capital throughout the region. 
Here are some specifics by sector: 
• Automobiles. NAFTA immediately decreases Mexican 
tariffs on automobiles from 20 percent to 10 percent and 
over the next 10 years decreases them to zero. It de-
creases tariffs on most auto parts to zero within 5 years. 
It includes rules of origin specifying that to qualify for 
preferential tariff treatment, vehicles must contain 62.5 
percent North American content, an increase over the 
50 percent provision in the U.S.-Canada Free Trade 
Agreement. NAFTA eliminates over 10 years require-
ments that automakers supplying the Mexican market 
produce the cars in Mexico and buy Mexican parts. It 
eliminates mandatory export quotas on foreign-owned 
auto manufacturing facilities in Mexico, and within 5 
years it eliminates Mexican restrictions on imports of 
buses and trucks. 
• Textiles and Apparel NAFTA immediately eliminates 
barriers to trade on over 20 percent of trade in textiles 
and apparel between Mexico and the United States. 
Over six years it eliminates barriers on another 60 per-
cent. It provides rules of origin which require that, to 
receive NAFTA tariff preferences, apparel be manufac-
tured in North America from the yam-spinning stage 
forward. 
• Agriculture. NAFTA immediately reduces tariffs from 
between 10 and 20 percent to zero for one-half of U.S. 
agricultural exports to Mexico; those for the other half 
it eliminates within 15 years. It immediately eliminates 
Mexico's licensing requirements for grains, dairy, and 
poultry. (As part of an agricultural reform program, 
Mexico is also eliminating most of the restrictions on 
buying and selling agricultural land.) 
• Energy and Petrochemicals. NAFTA immediately lifts 
trade and investment restrictions on most petrochemi-
cals. It allows foreign private ownership of electric pow-
er plants and allows foreigners to sell to state-owned 
Mexican energy companies under competitive bidding 
rules. 
• Financial Services. NAFTA eliminates over six years 
Mexico's restrictions on Canadian and U.S. ownership 
and provision of commercial banking, insurance, securi-
ties trading, and other financial services. Under 
NAFTA, Canadian and U.S. financial firms are allowed 
to establish wholly owned subsidiaries in Mexico and 
to engage in the same range of activities as similar Mex-
ican firms. 
21 Canadian to Mexican suppliers. Empirical evidence pre-
sented by Watson (1991), however, suggests much the 
same conclusion as the BDS model: by and large, Canadi-
an and Mexican exporters do not compete in the same U.S. 
markets. 
Brown, Deardorff, and Stern do show, however, that 
NAFTA presents a danger of import diversion for the rest 
of the world. In all but one scenario in their model, 
NAFTA results in losses for the rest of the world that are 
significant in absolute terms, although tiny as a percentage 
of GDP. In the scenario in which the rest of the world 
gains, it exports capital to Mexico that earns a substantial-
ly higher return than the capital would have otherwise. 
Since Mexico must export more goods to pay the higher 
return, the rest of the world sees a significant increase in 
its terms of trade. 
The largest impacts found among the different simula-
tions of the BDS model occur in that scenario—when capi-
tal is moved from the rest of the world to Mexico. In par-
ticular, allowing for capital flows into Mexico increases 
the net benefits of NAFTA to 5.4 percent of GDP in Mex-
ico. Remember, however, that these capital flows are sim-
ply imposed. Nonetheless, the results of the model are use-
ful in illustrating the relative importance of capital flows. 
Canada Alone 
The second model we examine focuses on the impact of 
NAFTA on the Canadian economy alone. 
Cox (1994) presents the results of a model developed 
jointly by Cox and Harris to analyze the impact of 
NAFTA. This model is an extension of an earlier model 
developed by Cox and Harris (1985) to analyze the im-
pact of the U.S.-Canada FTA on Canada. Like the BDS 
model, the Cox-Harris model includes considerable sector-
al detail: it has 14 tradable goods and 5 nontradable goods 
based on one- and two-digit Canadian Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) product categories. The Cox-Harris 
model uses the almost small-country assumption devel-
oped by Harris (1984) and described by us in the other ar-
ticle in this issue. This is a fully specified general equilib-
rium model of Canada, but the economic activity in Mexi-
co, the United States, and the rest of the world is modeled 
in very rudimentary ways. 
Of the 14 tradable goods, the 10 manufacturing goods 
are produced by firms that face increasing returns produc-
tion technologies. Unlike the BDS model, which specifies 
such goods as differentiated by firm, the Cox-Hanis mod-
el specifies these manufacturing goods as homogeneous 
within Canada. Firms in the industries that produce these 
The North American Free Trade Area 
vs. The European Union 
To appreciate the size and potential significance of the free 
trade area created by the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA), compare the area to the European Union. 
The accompanying table provides some data for this com-
parison. The NAFTA area obviously includes fewer coun-
tries than the European Union: only 3 vs. 16. (The European 
Union recently approved an expansion from 12 to 16 coun-
tries.) But note that the NAFTA area is larger in terms of 
both population and production. Note also that Mexico has 
a larger population and is poorer than the four poorest mem-
bers of the European Union: Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and 
Spain. And note that output per worker, or labor productivi-
ty, in Mexico is less than half of that in the United States. 
This ratio is similar to the ratio between Portugal and some 
of the richer countries of the European Union. 
Finally, note one great difference between countries in the 
NAFTA area. Output per person is about one-third of output 
per worker in Mexico, but about one-half in the United 
States. Most of this difference arises because Mexico has had 
a much higher population growth rate than has the United 
States; thus a larger fraction of Mexico's population is very 
young and not in the labor force. 
In making these comparisons of economic size, standard 
of living, and labor productivity across countries, we have 
used output adjusted for purchasing power parity. Such out-
put measures, constructed by Summers and Heston (1991, 
1993), value output at a common set of international prices. 
Summers and Heston argue that such measures are more use-
fill in cross-country comparisons than measures that simply 
use exchange rates to convert domestic measures of real out-
put from different currency units. 
NAFTA and the agreements that bind the members of the 
European Union are in some ways significantly different. 
NAFTA eliminates trade tariffs for 15 years, substantially re-
duces nontariff trade barriers, and ensures free capital flows 
throughout the region. Unlike the European Union agree-
ments, NAFTA does not erect trade barriers against the rest 
of the world or promote the free flow of labor throughout 
the region. (The lack of common trade barriers in NAFTA 
makes crucial its rules of origin, which determine whether 
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An International Economic Comparison 
In 1990 
Output (Thou. U.S. $) 




(Bil.U.S. $)  Per Person  Per Worker 
Canada  26.5  548.8  20.7  41.4 
Mexico  86.2  544.4  6.3  18.4 
United States  250.0  5,392.2  21.6  43.9 
North America  362.7  6,485.4  17.9  39.2 
Belgium  10.0  166.6  16.7  40.1 
Denmark  5.1  85.7  16.7  29.9 
France  56.4  941.5  16.7  36.4 
Germany (FRG)  62.1  1,125.2  18.1  37.3 
Greece  10.1  79.4  7.9  20.7 
Ireland  3.5  38.1  10.9  28.2 
Italy  57.7  868.5  15.1  37.1 
Luxembourg  .4  7.3  19.2  44.7 
Netherlands  14.9  232.3  15.5  37.3 
Portugal  10.4  80.7  7.8  17.3 
Spain  39.0  454.0  11.7  32.1 
United Kingdom  57.4  882.4  15.4  31.1 
12 Countries  327.0  4,961.7  15.2  33.9 
Austria  7.7  99.2  12.9  27.0 
Finland  5.0  70.9  14.2  27.7 
Norway  4.2  63.2  14.9  29.2 
Sweden  8.6  124.1  14.5  27.9 
16 Countries  352.5  5,319.0  15.1  33.4 
North American 
Free Trade Area 
European Union 
Sources: World Bank 1992, Summers and Heston 1993 
a product has enough North American content to qualify for 
preferential treatment.) Unlike the European Union agree-
ments, NAFTA does not include plans for significant direct 
redistribution to poorer regions within its area. Although 
NAFTA does establish dispute resolution mechanisms, pub-
lic discussion has not included plans for a central North 
American government like the European Parliament and the 
European Union bureaucracy. Neither has it included serious 
talk about a common currency system for North America, as 
has been proposed for Europe, although both Canadian and 
Mexican monetary authorities carefully manage their curren-
cies' exchange rates against the U.S. dollar. 
23 goods set prices that put half the weight on the Cournot 
(imperfectly competitive) pricing rule and half the weight 
on the Eastman-Stykolt (collusive) pricing rule. (We dis-
cuss both rules in the other article in this issue.) The 4 other 
tradable goods and the 5 nontradable goods are produced 
under conditions of constant returns and perfect competi-
tion. All of the tradable goods are modeled as Armington 
substitutes across countries. 
Another difference between the Cox-Hanis and BDS 
models lies in their treatment of capital flows. In two of 
the BDS simulations, capital is modeled as immobile; the 
third has an exogenously specified transfer of capital from 
the rest of the world to Mexico. In the Cox-Harris model, 
in contrast, capital is modeled as perfectly mobile between 
Canada and the United States. 
Cox (1994) reports the results of a simulation of the 
Cox-Harris model in which the aggregate impact on the 
Canadian economy of the U.S.-Canada FTA is an increase 
in economic welfare equivalent to 3.1 percent of GDP, an 
increase in the real wage of 5.5 percent, and a decrease in 
the terms of trade of -0.9 percent. The rental rate on capi-
tal remains fixed by assumption. 
The Cox-Hanis model finds a larger impact on Canada 
of the FTA with the United States than does the BDS mod-
el for two reasons. One is a difference in the two models' 
pricing specifications. The Eastman-Stykolt pricing rule 
used in the Cox-Harris model causes the tariff reductions 
in Canada to lead to a greater decrease in Canadian prices 
and a greater increase in Canadian output than does the 
Cournot specification used in the BDS model. As we dis-
cuss in the other article in this issue, the Eastman-Stykolt 
specification stresses collusive behavior by Canadian pro-
ducers while the Cournot specification stresses imperfectly 
competitive behavior. The FTA allows foreign competi-
tion that undermines the collusive behavior in the East-
man-Stykolt case, but merely increases the level of compe-
tition in the Cournot case. The other reason for the Cox-
Hanis model's larger FTA impact is its treatment of Cana-
da's capital stock. The Cox-Hanis model allows capital in-
flows into Canada to keep the rental rate on capital con-
stant. The BDS model assumes a constant Canadian capi-
tal stock and shows the Canadian rental rate rising in all 
three simulations. If capital inflows were allowed in the 
BDS model, this increase in the rental rate would trans-
form itself into capital inflows. 
The Cox-Harris model and the BDS model show some 
similarity in sectoral results. In both models, for example, 
Canada's textiles sector, rubber and plastics sector, and 
chemicals sector experience significant rationalization, with 
the number of firms falling, prices declining, and output 
per firm rising. All of these changes are somewhat larger 
in the Cox-Harris model than in the BDS model. Another 
parallel in the results generated by the two models is the 
increase in Canadian output of transportation equipment, 
8.5 percent in the BDS model and 8.9 percent in the Cox-
Harris model. 
Nonetheless, some of the models' sectoral results are 
very different. For Canadian output of chemicals and tex-
tiles, for example, the BDS model shows significant de-
creases and the Cox-Harris model significant increases. 
Whether these differences are due to differences in model 
specification or data sources is hard to tell. 
The two models completely agree on the incremental 
impact on Canada of NAFTA after the U.S.-Canada FTA 
has been taken into account. Like the BDS model, the 
Cox-Harris model finds that this impact is negligible. Fur-
thermore, Cox's (1994) simulations show little difference 
to Canada if that nation is a member of NAFTA or if the 
United States has separate FTAs with Canada and Mexi-
co, the hub and spoke arrangement often mentioned in the 
Canadian press. The reason for this indifference is clear: 
Before NAFTA, Canada and Mexico had little direct trade 
with each other compared to their trade with the United 
States. Since the Cox-Harris and BDS models are calibrat-
ed to existing trade flows, the calibrated utility functions 
and Armington aggregators manifest little preference in 
Canada or Mexico for each other's products. 
Mexico Alone 
Our third model concentrates on NAFTA's effects on 
Mexico's economy. 
Sobarzo (1994) uses a model of Mexico that is struc-
tured similarly to the Cox and Harris (1985) model of 
Canada. Like the Cox-Harris model, the Sobarzo model 
adopts the almost small-country assumption, in this case 
focusing on the Mexican economy. (No such model exists 
for the United States because of the country's size and rel-
ative importance in terms of trade flows.) Like the BDS 
and Cox-Hanis models, the Sobarzo model includes con-
siderable sectoral detail: it has 21 tradable goods and 6 
nontradable goods, based on the product classification used 
in the Mexican national income and product accounts. 
Of the 21 tradable goods, the 18 manufactured goods 
are produced under increasing returns and imperfect com-
petition, just as manufactured goods are in the Cox-Harris 
model. The other goods are produced under other condi-
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Table 2 
NAFTA's Potential Effects on Mexico 
According to the Sobarzo Model 
Predicted % Change in Mexico's 
Welfare 
Experiment (GDP) Wage Rate Employment Rental Rate Terms of Trade 
1. Fix Mexico's capital stock and employment. 3.7 4.3 .0 4.6 1.5 
2. Fix Mexico's capital stock and real wage;  let its employment vary. 4.9 .0 5.1 6.2 3.1 
3. Fix Mexico's rental rate, terms of trade, and 
employment; let its capital stock and 
trade balance vary. 10.9 16.2 .0 .0 .0 
Source: Sobarzo 1994, Table 3 
tions: 2 of the tradable goods and the 6 nontradable goods, 
under constant returns and perfect competition; one trad-
able good, mining, under constant returns and government 
regulation. 
Sobarzo (1994) describes the results of three experi-
ments. In the first, he considers only NAFTA's tariff re-
ductions and assumes that labor is fully employed and the 
capital stock is fixed. In the second experiment, he keeps 
the assumption of a fixed capital stock, but fixes the real 
wage and allows the level of employment to vary with the 
demand for labor. In the third experiment, he returns to 
the assumption of full employment, but fixes the rental rate 
on capital and allows capital flows from Canada, the Unit-
ed States, and the rest of the world. In this third experi-
ment, Sobarzo also fixes the terms of trade and allows the 
trade balance to vary. The aggregate results of these three 
experiments are summarized in Table 2. 
As do the BDS results, Sobarzo's results illustrate the 
importance of capital flows. Allowing employment to vary 
causes only modest changes in the results, but allowing 
capital inflows greatly increases Mexico's welfare gains 
due to NAFTA, from 3.7 percent of GDP to 10.9 percent. 
That Sobarzo's model finds a larger NAFTA impact on 
Mexico than does the BDS model is due once again to the 
Eastman-Stykolt pricing rule. As do Cox and Harris 
(1985), Sobarzo uses a mixed pricing formula for imper-
fectly competitive firms that puts a 50 percent weight on 
the Eastman-Stykolt rule and a 50 percent weight on the 
Cournot rule. To illustrate the importance of the Eastman-
Stykolt specification, he repeats his third experiment with 
different weights on the two pricing rules. When he in-
creases the weight on the Eastman-Stykolt rule from 50 to 
100 percent, Mexico's welfare gain due to NAFTA rises 
from 10.9 percent of GDP to 21.2 percent; when he re-
duces the weight on the Eastman-Stykolt rule from 50 to 
0 percent, the welfare gain falls to 1.4 percent. 
The significance of the weight placed on the Eastman-
Stykolt pricing rule is not just a technicality: it reflects the 
degree to which Sobarzo thinks that Mexican producers 
have behaved collusively in setting high prices before 
NAFTA. The higher the degree of collusive behavior be-
fore NAFTA, the lower prices will fall after it. Like Cox 
and Harris (1985) with Canadian firms, Sobarzo thinks 
collusive behavior is prevalent enough among Mexican 
firms to set the weight significantly higher than 0 percent, 
but not prevalent enough to set it equal to 100 percent. He 
chooses 50 percent as an intermediate value, but this is 
obviously a choice that merits further study. 
Between the Sobarzo and BDS models, the sectoral 
results are mixed. Significant areas of agreement exist. 
Both models, for example, show large increases in Mex-
ico's output in the mining, iron and steel, nonferrous met-
als, electric and nonelectric machinery, and transportation 
equipment industries. Areas of disagreement also exist, 
however. These include the result of the BDS model that 
by far the largest percentage increase in Mexican output 
25 occurs in the nonferrous metals sector; the Sobarzo model 
shows a much more modest increase for this sector and 
large gains for several other sectors. 
The Auto Industry 
The last model we examine differs from the others we 
have discussed because it focuses on a single but very im-
portant sector: automobiles. (For data on the relative im-
portance of this sector in North America, see the Appen-
dix.) 
Markusen, Rutherford, and Hunter (1994) study the au-
tomobile industry in all three North American countries. 
Their model, like the BDS model, fully endogenizes eco-
nomic behavior in each of the three countries and in the 
rest of the world. Unlike the BDS model, however, the 
Markusen-Rutherford-Hunter (MRH) model does not dif-
ferentiate products by firm or by country of origin. Instead 
the model has two homogeneous products: finished auto-
mobiles and an aggregate other good. Automobiles are 
produced subject to increasing returns and Cournot com-
petition, while the other good is produced subject to con-
stant returns and perfect competition. Firms in North 
America are multinational; they all can operate plants in 
all of the three countries. 
While calibrating their model, Markusen, Rutherford, 
and Hunter find that their data on marginal costs, fixed 
costs, and average output and their assumptions of free 
entry and zero profits are inconsistent with their calibrated 
perceived elasticity of demand in the Lerner condition for 
profit maximization: 
(1) p = a/[l-mi 
Here p is the price of automobiles, a is the marginal cost, 
and 8 is the perceived elasticity of demand (which de-
pends on the number of firms, the trade barriers, the pa-
rameters of the utility function, and so on). The zero-profit 
condition is 
(2) py-ay-f= 0. 
Here y is firm output and/is fixed costs. The problem is 
that when Markusen, Rutherford, and Hunter plug the price 
derived from the Lerner condition into the formula for 
profits, they obtain negative profits. 
To get around this problem, they modify the Lerner 
condition with what they call a conjecture parameter, X: 
(3) p = Xa/[ 1 - (1/e)]. 
This parameter is interpreted as a measure of the degree 
of collusive behavior within a country. The larger X is, the 
more pervasive is collusive behavior. Markusen, Ruther-
ford, and Hunter calibrate X to be very close to 1.0 in the 
United States, indicating that U.S. industry behavior is al-
most exactly Cournot, while X is 1.7 in Canada and 2.7 in 
Mexico, indicating significant collusive behavior. Intro-
ducing this conjecture parameter is similar to putting 
weight on the Eastman-Stykolt pricing rule in the Cox-
Hanis and Sobarzo models. 
Markusen, Rutherford, and Hunter report two types of 
simulations. One allows free trade for producers only, al-
lowing multinational producers to price-discriminate across 
countries. The other allows free trade for consumers as 
well. Markusen, Rutherford, and Hunter find that if multi-
national automobile producers can price-discriminate after 
NAFTA, they will do so, charging higher prices for auto-
mobiles in Mexico than in the United States or Canada. 
Allowing consumers to purchase goods across borders, 
however, eliminates this ability to discriminate and leads 
to a lower price and a higher level of production of auto-
mobiles. Without NAFTA, individual Mexicans could not 
import an automobile from abroad. Under NAFTA, this re-
striction, like many other nontariff barriers on trade in au-
tomobiles, will be phased out over a 10-year period. 
The results generated by the MRH model are consis-
tent with those of the BDS model, at least qualitatively. In 
the MRH model, NAFTA has a significantly positive im-
pact on Mexico, barely perceptible impacts on Canada and 
the United States, and negative trade diversion effects on 
the rest of the world. In the MRH simulation with free 
trade for producers only, the welfare gain for Mexico is 
0.09 percent of GDP; in the simulation with free trade for 
consumers, this gain is 0.80 percent. Both of these are 
much smaller than the gains from the BDS model. But 
that size comparison does not make much sense because, 
remember, the MRH model considers the impact of trade 
liberalization for only the automobile sector. 
The two models find somewhat different results for au-
to production. The BDS model finds changes of 8.5 per-
cent in Canada, 14.8 percent in Mexico, and -0.3 percent 
in the United States; the MRH model finds changes of 
-0.6 percent, 21.9 percent, and -0.5 percent with free 
trade for producers only and -2.0 percent, 44.9 percent, 
and -1.8 percent with free trade for consumers as well. 
The large increases in Mexico found by the MRH model 
are partly due to the large conjecture parameter calibrated 
for that country and partly to the homogeneous products 
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assumption. Automobile prices in Mexico before free trade 
are high because of high trade barriers and the high level 
of collusive behavior there. Since automobiles are a ho-
mogeneous good, lowering the Mexican tariff results in an 
equal decline in the Mexican price of automobiles, at least 
when consumers enjoy free trade. In contrast, in the BDS 
model, Mexican automobile producers are not forced to 
lower their prices by the full amount of the tariff reduction 
because products from Canada and the United States are 
differentiated by firm and thus are not perfect substitutes 
for Mexican products. 
The Sobarzo model is similar to the BDS model on 
this point. Unless the weight on the Eastman-Stykolt pric-
ing rule is 100 percent, declines in Mexican tariffs do not 
result in equal declines in Mexican prices because imports, 
since they are differentiated by country of origin, are not 
perfect substitutes for domestically produced goods. 
In explicitly incorporating the plant location decisions 
of multinational firms, the MRH model is a tool that can 
be used to investigate other features of industries like the 
automobile industry and their reactions to policies like 
NAFTA. An extension of this model by Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Markusen, and Rutherford (1993), for example, studies the 
impact of NAFTA on the markets for parts and inter-
mediate inputs. Another extension by Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Markusen, and Rutherford (1994) carefully models all of 
the nontariff barriers in the automobile industry before and 
after NAFTA. One such pre-NAFTA barrier in Mexico 
was a trade balance restriction that every peso's worth of 
imports by an automobile producer had to be balanced by 
two pesos' worth of exports. The most significant nontar-
iff barrier established by NAFTA is a domestic content 
rule. It requires that at least 62.5 percent of the value of 
an automobile must be generated within North America 
for the automobile to be given preferential treatment. This 
requirement is an increase from 50 percent in a similar re-
quirement in the U.S.-Canada FTA. The content rule is 
likely to have a great impact on Japanese and European 
automobile producers with plants in North America. Tak-
ing these additional restrictions into account, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Markusen, and Rutherford (1994) find that 
NAFTA will provide an advantage to U.S. producers that 
results in a 1 percent increase in employment in the U.S. 
automobile industry. 
Greater Gains Possible 
The models we have considered thus far capture the 
changes in prices, output, and welfare from NAFTA that 
should be generated by resources shifting across sectors in 
response to the new incentives generated by freer trade. 
These models assume that labor and capital are costlessly 
mobile across sectors. In contrast, much of the recent dis-
cussion about NAFTA in the United States focused on the 
costs of shifting workers across sectors and regions and the 
size of the resulting capital flows into Mexico. 
No current economic model of NAFTA incorporates 
the dynamic process of how workers lose old job-specific 
skills and gain new ones when they change jobs. Nor does 
any model provide a precise estimate of what capital flows 
into Mexico will be. So the best we can do is examine the 
existing relevant data and studies and speculate on the po-
tential size and significance of the labor force adjustment 
in the United States and the capital flows into Mexico that 
could result from NAFTA. 
We find that the potential amount of labor force adjust-
ment in the United States due to NAFTA is small relative 
to both the size of the U.S. labor force and the amount of 
adjustment that occurs every year for other reasons. We 
find that NAFTA's potential impact on capital flows is far 
more significant, especially for Mexico. 
Small Labor Adjustment Costs 
In a recent study, Stem, Deardorff, and Brown (1992) cal-
culate the employment changes by industry and region in 
the United States after NAFTA. Using their methodology, 
we can calculate the impact of NAFTA on employment by 
region in the United States of the scenario in the BDS 
model in which tariffs and nontariff trade barriers are elim-
inated and capital flows into Mexico equal 10 percent of 
the current Mexican capital stock. The total number of 
workers who are predicted to change either industry or re-
gion is only about 76,000. 
To get some feel for the predicted labor force adjust-
ment, we examine how it is distributed across nine regions 
of the United States. (These are the regions used by Stern, 
Deardorff, and Brown 1992.) On the accompanying map, 
the first number displayed for each region indicates the 
percentage of workers who are predicted to temporarily 
lose employment within a sector in that region due to 
NAFTA. (In the model, these workers become employed 
either in a new sector within the region or in some other 
region.) The second number in each region indicates the 
net change of employment within the region. Altogether, 
these numbers suggest that the job displacement caused by 
NAFTA will be fairly evenly distributed across regions. In 
every region, the change in employment is extremely small 
compared to the area's total employment: no changes are 
even as large as 0.1 percent. The numbers must be viewed 
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with care, however, since the model that produced them 
does not take into account geographical advantages due to 
factors like transportation costs. A model that took those 
factors into account might generate more job creation in 
the southern and western states (since they are closest to 
Mexico). 
The BDS model assumes full employment, which 
means that job creation and job destruction balance. That 
its results show an increase in real wages due to NAFTA 
indicates that, had the real wage been held fixed and em-
ployment been allowed to vary, job creation would have 
exceeded job destruction in this model, and employment 
would have increased. Using an alternative methodology, 
Hufbauer and Schott (1992) estimate that NAFTA will cre-
ate 320,000 jobs and eliminate 150,000. Other researchers 
have made other estimates. Summarizing their results, the 
U.S. Congressional Budget Office (1993, p. 86) places the 
high end of estimated job destruction at around 200,000 
jobs. (Most studies also indicate even more job creation, 
but the costs involved in losing old job-specific skills and 
acquiring new ones impose an asymmetry between job de-
struction and job creation.) 
The overwhelming impression of these numbers is that, 
relative to the size of the U.S. labor force, they are minus-
cule. Indeed, Stem, Deardorff, and Brown's (1992) esti-
mated 76,000 affected workers are out of a total civilian 
labor force of about 116 million. The numbers of NAFTA-
affected workers are also tiny relative to the average 
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amount of job-shifting that occurs every year in the Unit-
ed States. Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) calculate net job 
creation and destruction at the establishment level in U.S. 
manufacturing. They find that on average from 1973 to 
1986 the rates of gross job creation and destruction in 
U.S. manufacturing were both about 10 percent per year. 
Since the U.S. manufacturing labor force averaged 19 mil-
lion workers over this period, that translates to almost 2 
million jobs destroyed each year in manufacturing alone. 
Of course, roughly the same number of new jobs were cre-
ated. Since the manufacturing industries include less than 
20 percent of all the jobs in the United States, the total 
gross job destruction across all sectors must be substan-
tially higher. Clearly, NAFTA's impact on job destruction 
should be very small. 
Still, the models we have discussed so far are static and 
measure workers in terms of effective labor units. This 
means that a worker who is paid twice as much as another 
is assumed to be supplying twice as much effective labor. 
And when a worker shifts from one sector to another, this 
effective labor is assumed to be transferred. Actually, of 
course, workers who shift across sectors lose any job-spe-
cific expertise they had built up in their previous jobs. 
They may eventually gain expertise in their new jobs, but 
they will not have it immediately. Although no existing 
model of NAFTA formally models the dynamic impact of 
losing and gaining job-specific expertise, labor economists 
have spent a lot of time trying to measure the amount of 
wages workers lose when they lose this expertise. Topel 
(1991), for example, uses panel data to attempt to estimate 
the amount wages increase with years on a job, while hold-
ing fixed the total number of years in the labor force. His 
estimates indicate that the losses for displaced workers are 
potentially large: a worker with five years' tenure on a job 
who loses a job and finds a new one, for example, may 
lose as much as 40 percent of his or her wage in the first 
year after the displacement. 
To put that number into perspective, remember that on 
average workers change jobs at least six times in a life-
time (Hall 1982). Thus workers are often displaced. The 
point to be made is qualitative, however: even though the 
total number of likely job changes due to NAFTA is tiny 
compared to the entire U.S. labor force, the impact on the 
small number of workers who are actually displaced may 
be large. The U.S. Congressional Budget Office (1993) 
summarizes research on the costs of job displacement (and 
discusses existing federal programs to help workers who 
lose their jobs). 
Large Capital Inflows 
As we have seen, the other potential dynamic impact of 
NAFTA may not be so small. The models of Brown, 
Deardorff, and Stern (1994) and Sobarzo (1994) deal with 
capital flows in simple ways, but they make an important 
point: if NAFTA leads to large capital flows into Mexico, 
then the welfare gains for that country will be much larger 
than otherwise. Here we discuss some factors that should 
be included in a more satisfactory analysis of the capital 
flows that could result from NAFTA. 
Foreign investment in Mexico has increased dramati-
cally in recent years, and some evidence suggests that this 
trend will continue under NAFTA. During the period 
1988-91, the real interest rate in Mexico—calculated by 
subtracting inflation, measured by changes in the consum-
er price index, from the average cost of funds—was 11.6 
percent. (See International Monetary Fund 1993.) During 
the same period, the corresponding real interest rate in the 
United States—calculated using the prime rate—was 5.0 
percent. The difference in interest rates suggests that Mex-
ico is an attractive investment target. 
We see two obvious explanations for the higher return 
on investment in Mexico, and both have a bearing on the 
capital flows that will result from NAFTA. 
One explanation is that the difference in return repre-
sents a risk premium in Mexico. Investors fear high rates 
of Mexican inflation—or even a financial collapse and 
major devaluation of the peso as occurred in 1982. The 
key question, of course, is, How much will NAFTA en-
sure economic stability in Mexico? Insofar as it locks the 
Mexican government into the trade liberalization that has 
already occurred over the past seven years and guarantees 
Mexican exporters continued access to U.S. markets, 
NAFTA goes a long way toward ensuring stability. 
Lucas (1990), however, has argued that inefficient and 
oligopolistic financial intermediaries may be a more im-
portant explanation for the relatively high rates of return 
and low levels of investment in relatively poor countries. 
Recent studies have provided clear evidence that financial 
intermediaries in Mexico are inefficient and oligopolistic. 
Garber and Weisbrod (1993) point out that the largest three 
banks in Mexico hold 65 percent of the loans; Gruben, 
Welch, and Gunther (1993) report that in recent years the 
spread between the rates lenders charge borrowers and the 
rates lenders must pay for funds themselves has been 
much higher in Mexico than in the United States. Under 
NAFTA, Mexico will open its financial services sector to 
foreign trade and investment. U.S. exports of financial ser-
29 vices to Mexico and investment in financial intermediaries 
there are likely to be important sources of gains from 
NAFTA for both Mexico and the United States, gains that 
are not captured by the models we have discussed. 
Regardless of the reason for increased capital flows in-
to Mexico that might result from NAFTA, note that even 
capital flows several times larger than those currently ob-
served would be very small compared to foreign capital 
flows into the United States and to the world capital mar-
ket. Over the period 1984-91, for example, foreign direct 
investment in Mexico averaged $2.3 billion per year, with 
a high of $4.8 billion in 1991. Over the same period, for-
eign direct investment in the United States averaged $40.1 
billion per year, with a high of $67.9 billion in 1989. (See 
International Monetary Fund 1992a.) 
Note also that increased investment in Mexico will di-
vert investment away from the United States only insofar 
as it increases international interest rates or decreases the 
profitability of investment projects in the United States. 
The tiny size of Mexico compared to world capital markets 
suggests that opening that country to more foreign invest-
ment should have little effect on interest rates. Over the 
period 1984-91, only 1.4 percent of world foreign direct 
investment went to Mexico, with a high of 2.8 percent in 
1991. (Again, see International Monetary Fund 1992a.) 
More important, the results of the models discussed here 
indicate that NAFTA should make investment projects in 
the United States more, rather than less, profitable. 
Better Models Needed 
The models discussed both here and in the other article in 
this issue provide clear indications of the directions and 
relative sizes of the impacts of NAFTA on its member 
countries. Nevertheless, like any economic model, these 
models are limited. A dynamic AGE model that incorpo-
rates the adjustment process of moving from one job to 
another and investment decisions under uncertainty would 
do much to inform the public debate over job destruction 
and capital flows. At the very least, a dynamic AGE mod-
el could explicitly take into account the phase-in period of 
15 years for all the provisions of NAFTA. The timing of 
this phase-in is necessarily ignored by static models of 
NAFTA. 
A dynamic AGE model with overlapping generations 
of workers could also address some interesting generation-
al issues involved in NAFTA. For example, its labor force 
adjustment costs are likely to fall more on older workers, 
who may have more job-specific skills than younger work-
ers. Any diversion of investment from the United States 
to Mexico, however, is likely to hurt young workers more; 
older workers are likely to benefit as the returns on their 
retirement funds increase. Although these costs and bene-
fits are likely to be extremely small in the United States, 
they are likely to be much bigger in Mexico. 
An overlapping generations model of the North Ameri-
can economies would need to take into account a signifi-
cant difference between Mexico and its North American 
partners that does not play a major role in static models. 
Until recently, population has grown much faster in Mexi-
co than in Canada or the United States. This has resulted 
in a substantially younger population in Mexico than in the 
other two countries. For example, 1990 census data indi-
cate that in Mexico, half the population is aged 19 years or 
younger, while in the United States, half is aged 34 years 
or younger. 
As well as helping better address the issues discussed 
here, a dynamic AGE model could be used to analyze the 
impact of NAFTA on productivity growth rates. Recent 
work on growth theory suggests that this impact may be 
substantial, particularly in Mexico. Using a single frame-
work drawn from this theory and some tentative empirical 
work based on cross-country growth experiences from 
1970 to 1985, Kehoe (1994) suggests that increased open-
ness could lead to a 1 or 2 percent per year increase in pro-
ductivity growth in Mexican manufacturing. Compounded 
over 20 or 30 years, such an increase would have a sub-
stantial impact on Mexico. By providing a growing mar-
ket for U.S. exports, it would also yield significant bene-
fits for the United States. 
In Sum 
Using a formal model, such as a static AGE model, forces 
an economic analyst to make all assumptions explicitly and 
consistently. The models discussed here (and in the other 
article in this issue) have their limitations, but their explic-
itness and consistency let us evaluate their predictions. 
These models find that NAFTA is likely to have a sig-
nificantly positive impact on the Mexican economy; a pos-
itive, but very small, impact on the U.S. economy; and al-
most no impact on the Canadian economy beyond that 
generated by the U.S.-Canada FTA. Mexico's impact looks 
much larger when other likely effects are taken into ac-
count: an inflow of foreign capital and an increase in pro-
ductivity. Prosperity and growth in Mexico would also 
have positive effects on its North American neighbors, es-
pecially the United States. 
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Appendix 
North American Trade Data 
Examining data on the current levels and composition of trade 
among the three North American countries can help us under-
stand and interpret the results produced by the models discussed 
in the preceding article. 
The accompanying chart displays the exports and imports 
among Canada, Mexico, and the United States in 1991. Notice 
that, although Canada is the number one trading partner of the 
United States and Mexico is number three after Japan, the Unit-
ed States conducts only about one-quarter of its trade with its 
two North American neighbors. In contrast, more than two-
thirds of foreign trade in both Canada and Mexico is with the 
United States. Canada and Mexico have little direct trade with 
Foreign Trade in North America 
In 1991 











Source: International Monetary Fund 1992b 
31 U.S. Merchandise Trade by Commodity 
In 1991 (Millions of 1991 U.S. Dollars) 
Selected Commodities* 
U.S. Exports to  U.S. Imports From 
Selected Commodities*  Entire World  Canada  Mexico  Entire World  Canada  Mexico 
0 Food and Live Animals  29,555  4,204  2,086  23,924  4,023  2,666 
03 Fish, Related Products  3,056  329  17  5,951  1,248  297 
04 Cereals  10,916  362  686  1,092  423  40 
05 Vegetables and Fruit  5,329  1,727  153  6,244  287  1,509 
1 Beverages and Tobacco  6,750  141  44  5,132  746  267 
2 Crude Materials Except Fuels  25,462  2,748  1,626  14,317  6,888  782 
22 OilSeeds  4,324  97  391  150  83  27 
24 Cork and Wood  5,103  665  227  3,342  2,970  145 
25 Pulp and Waste Paper  3,604  227  285  2,301  1,983  2 
28 Metal Ores and Scrap  3,989  929  178  3,881  994  213 
3 Mineral Fuels, Related Products  12,033  1,240  865  58,557  10,992  4,876 
33 Petroleum, Related Products  6,586  644  706  54,150  7,308  4,751 
4 Animal and Vegetable Fats, Oils  1,147  64  143  927  138  31 
5 Chemicals, Related Products  42,965  6,554  2,624  25,289  4,603  748 
51 Organic Chemicals  10,928  1,088  705  8,450  797  257 
52 Inorganic Chemicals  4,102  489  259  3,533  1,078  193 
6 Manufacturing, by Material  35,566  10,266  4,419  60,362  15,762  2,364 
64 Paper, Related Products  5,961  1,536  775  8,435  6,352  124 
65 Textiles, Related Products  5,457  1,350  541  7,339  506  330 
67 Iron and Steel  4,365  1,393  873  10,073  1,579  314 
68 Nonferrous Metals  5,713  1,210  425  8,621  3,687  356 
7 Machinery, Transportation Equipment  187,360  42,289  15,059  215,950  41,030  15,040 
71 Power Generating Machinery  16,968  4,097  1,070  14,487  2,344  1,140 
72 Specialized Machinery  16,565  2,658  1,222  11,244  1,122  142 
74 General Industrial Machinery  17,107  4,654  1,548  14,891  1,812  837 
75 Office Machines, Computers  25,954  3,680  1,002  30,703  2,324  729 
76 Telecommunications  9,966  1,486  1,506  23,915  1,013  2,965 
77 Electrical Machinery  29,935  6,175  4,211  35,822  3,686  4,875 
78 Road Vehicles and Parts  31,805  17,396  3,590  72,732  25,945  4,312 
79 Other Transportation Equipment  36,355  1,739  671  8,414  2,550  33 
8 Miscellaneous Manufacturing  43,162  8,122  3,694  87,375  3,689  3,658 
82 Furniture  2,113  895  638  5,286  1,081  751 
84 Apparel, Clothing  3,212  244  533  27,699  319  921 
87 Scientific Instruments  13,488  1,883  999  6,908  585  648 
9 Not Classified Elsewhere  13,447  2,654  1,612  15,423  4,635  1,401 
Total**  397,448  78,282  32,172  507,255  92,505  31,834 
*The commodities are coded by the Standard International Trade Classification (revision 3), one-digit and selected two-digit codes. 
Since all the data have been rounded somewhat, the subtotals do not necessarily sum to the totals. Also, the totals on this table may 
not match export/import totals elsewhere in the article because these data are from different sources. 
Source: OECD 
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each other. Put bluntly, and somewhat simplistically, in Canada 
and Mexico, foreign trade means trade with the United States. 
The accompanying table reports the composition of that 
trade by sector in 1991. The data have some interesting patterns. 
Although all three countries are large agricultural producers, ag-
riculture is not a major trading industry for any of them. Canada 
exports significant amounts of wood, paper products, and non-
ferrous metals to the United States, revealing a comparative ad-
vantage in raw materials over the United States, which itself ex-
ports a large amount of these sorts of goods to the rest of the 
world. Both Canada and Mexico export a large amount of pe-
troleum to the United States. 
Perhaps the most significant patterns in the data, however, 
are the concentration of trade in machinery and transportation 
equipment and the large amount of cross-hauling, the simulta-
neous exporting and importing of goods in the same category. 
The largest category of Canadian exports to the United States, 
at the two-digit Standard International Trade Classification level, 
is road vehicles and parts; this is also the largest category of ex-
ports from the United States to Canada. The largest two catego-
ries of United States exports to Mexico are electrical machinery 
and road vehicles and parts; these are the largest and third-larg-
est categories of exports from Mexico to the United States, the 
second-largest being petroleum and petrochemicals. References 
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